Publication Type
Conference Paper
Publication Date
6-2012
Abstract
Auditors risk costly litigation and loss of reputation when they are associated with clients that engage in substandard financial reporting, and prior research argues that accounting conservatism reduces managements‟ tendency to misreport. Thus, we predict that client conservatism affects auditor-client contracting by reducing auditor litigation and reputation risk. Consistent with our predictions, we find that conservative audit clients are less likely to trigger auditor litigation or issue accounting restatements; and that auditors of conservative clients charge lower audit fees, issue fewer going concern opinions, and resign less frequently. Taken together, these findings are consistent with client accounting conservatism playing an important role in auditor-client contracting and outcomes.
Keywords
accounting conservatism, auditor litigation, auditor reputation, audit pricing, audit opinion, auditor resignation, accounting restatements
Discipline
Accounting | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
Publication
International Association for Accounting Education and Research Annual Meetings
City or Country
Amsterdam, Netherlands
Citation
ZANG, Yoonseok; LIM, Chee Yeow; and DEFOND, Mark.
Client Conservatism and Auditor-Client Contracting. (2012). International Association for Accounting Education and Research Annual Meetings.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1013
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Included in
Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Corporate Finance Commons