Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2000

Abstract

Anderson and Kuhn have proposed the EEPROM modification attack to recover the secret key stored in the EEPROM. At ACISP ’98, Fung and Gray proposed an m-permutation protection scheme against the EEPROM modification attack. At ACISP ’99, Fung and Gray pointed out that in their original scheme, a secret key with too small or too large Hamming weight could be recovered easily. Then they proposed a revised m- permutation protection scheme and claimed that their revised scheme does not leak any information of the secret key. In this paper, we break completely both the original and the revised m-permutation protection schemes. The original scheme is broken with about 2log2 n devices from the same batch and about (3log2 n +2 ) ×m ×n probes (n is the length of the secret key and m is the amount of permutations). The revised m-permutation protection scheme is more vulnerable than the original one. It could be broken with only one device and about m ×n 3/3 probes.

Keywords

Public key cryptography, Data privacy, Information protection, Secrecy protection, Security key, Computer security

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Information Security and Privacy: 5th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2000, Brisbane, Australia, July 10-12, 2000. Proceedings

Volume

1841

First Page

97

Last Page

111

ISBN

9783540450306

Identifier

10.1007/10718964_9

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

Berlin

Copyright Owner and License

Publisher

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/10718964_9

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