Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

2-2001

Abstract

At ISW’99, Nishioka, Hanaoka and Imai proposed a digital signature scheme on ID-based key-sharing infrastructures. That signature scheme is claimed to be secure if the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve. Two schemes (the ID-type and the random-type schemes) based on the linear scheme for the Key Predistribution Systems (KPS) and the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) were given. In this paper we show that those two schemes fail to meet the nonrepudiation requirement: with negligible amount of computation, a signature could be forged. For the ID-type signature scheme, any verifier could forge a signature to raise repudiation between that verifier and the signer. The random type signature scheme has the same weakness. Furthermore, for the random-type signature scheme, once a signer issued a signature, anyone (not only the user in the scheme) could forge that signer's signature for a n arbitrary message.

Keywords

Computation theory, Cryptography, Electronic document identification systems, Public key cryptography, Digital signature schemes, Discrete logarithm problems, ID-based, Key pre-distribution, Key sharing, Non-repudiation, Signature Scheme

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Public Key Cryptography: 4th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2001, Cheju Island, Korea, February 13-15: Proceedings

Volume

1992

First Page

173

Last Page

179

ISBN

9783540445869

Identifier

10.1007/3-540-44586-2_13

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

Berlin

Copyright Owner and License

Publisher

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44586-2_13

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