Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

12-2019

Abstract

We investigate how firms react to their product-market peers' commitment to and adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) using a regression discontinuity design approach. Relying on the passage or failure of CSR proposals by a narrow margin of votes during shareholder meetings, we find the passage of a close-call CSR proposal and its implementation are followed by the adoption of similar CSR practices by peer firms. In addition, peers that have greater difficulty in catching up with the voting firm in CSR experience significantly lower stock returns around the passage, consistent with the notion that the spillover effect of the adoption of CSR is a strategic response to competitive threat. Using alternative definitions of peers and examining underlying mechanisms, we further rule out alternative explanations, such as that based on propagation by financial intermediaries.

Keywords

corporate social responsibility, peer effects, shareholder proposal, regression discontinuity

Discipline

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Management Science

Volume

65

Issue

12

First Page

5487

Last Page

5503

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.2018.3100

Publisher

INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3100

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