Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-2000
Abstract
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization-performance relationship. The authors argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). The authors suggest that postprivatization performance can be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and they highlight avenues for research.
Keywords
Privatization, Agency theory, organizational structure
Discipline
Business | Organizational Behavior and Theory | Strategic Management Policy
Research Areas
Strategy and Organisation
Publication
Academy of Management Review
Volume
25
Issue
3
First Page
650
Last Page
669
ISSN
0001-4273
Identifier
10.5465/AMR.2000.3363533
Publisher
Academy of Management
Citation
DHARWADKAR, Bavi; GEORGE, Gerard; and BRANDES, Pamela.
Privatization in Emerging Economies: An Agency Theory Perspective. (2000). Academy of Management Review. 25, (3), 650-669.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4632
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2000.3363533