Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2009
Abstract
We posit that a firm's resource configuration constitutes a critical context for various corporate governance mechanisms. Although innovative knowledge assets are generally a key determinant of a firm's economic performance, they also lead to greater information asymmetry among managers and owners and to the need to grant managers more discretion in making resource deployment decisions. This weakens the role of monitoring but increases the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. Therefore, we hypothesize asymmetric moderating effects of monitoring- and incentive-based governance mechanisms on the relationship between innovative knowledge assets and economic performance. Our empirical analyses provide support for the key arguments.
Discipline
Strategic Management Policy
Research Areas
Strategy and Organisation
Publication
Academy of Management Journal
Volume
52
Issue
5
First Page
919
Last Page
938
ISSN
0001-4273
Identifier
10.5465/AMJ.2009.44633414
Publisher
Academy of Management
Citation
HE, Jinyu and WANG, Heli.
Innovative knowledge assets and economic performance: The asymmetric roles of incentives and monitoring. (2009). Academy of Management Journal. 52, (5), 919-938.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3446
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2009.44633414