Publication Type
PhD Dissertation
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2026
Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters contributing to the fields of international trade and spatial economics, with a particular focus on quantitative general equilibrium modeling and strategic policy interactions.
The first chapter investigates the environmental and economic impacts of the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It develops a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model featuring input–output linkages, carbon supply chains, and global emission externalities. The results show that unilateral implementation modestly reduces global emissions due to carbon leakage through global energy markets. When other countries respond optimally, strategic carbon policy adjustments under a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium enhance global emission reductions by mitigating both carbon leakage and free-riding. Under a cooperative equilibrium with Nash bargaining, multilateral negotiations yield substantial welfare and environmental gains, demonstrating that the CBAM functions as an effective enforcement device that raises the cost of disagreement and fosters deeper global climate cooperation.
The second chapter examines how non-cooperative tariffs change outside options and serve as leverage to affect welfare outcomes in potential tariff negotiations. It focuses specifically on the U.S.–China trade war from 2018 through 2019. Utilizing a multi-country, multi-sector quantitative trade model, this chapter simulates negotiations from two starting points: the 2017 pre-war baseline and the 2019 trade-war equilibrium. The results show that, across reasonable estimates of U.S. bargaining power, imposing trade-war tariffs prior to negotiations consistently enhances U.S. post-negotiation welfare.
The third chapter studies higher education investment in the presence of skilled graduate mobility. It develops a dynamic spatial life-cycle general equilibrium model in which individuals endogenously choose education and migration, while local governments allocate budgets and set admission policies. Quantified to the context of China, the model shows that the observed college expansion path reflects substantial underinvestment relative to a central planner benchmark, leaving large efficiency and equity gains unrealized. Underinvestment persists in a decentralized, locally funded Nash equilibrium, as provinces strategically free ride on inflows of graduates educated elsewhere and hold back their own investment, leading to national inefficiency. Optimal place-based strategies depend on development stage: advanced regions benefit from front-loaded education investment, whereas lagging provinces optimally delay investment until productivity and retention conditions improve.
Degree Awarded
PhD in Economics
Discipline
International Economics
Supervisor(s)
MEI, Yuan; MA, Lin
First Page
1
Last Page
197
Publisher
Singapore Management University
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
NI, Tong.
Essays on international trade and spatial economics. (2026). 1-197.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/888
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.