Publication Type
PhD Dissertation
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2026
Abstract
As the Belt and Road Initiative continues to advance, multinational corporations from emerging economies have become increasingly reliant on expatriates to oversee overseas project execution, facilitate technology transfer, and manage on-site coordination. However, in contexts characterized by financial constraints, information opacity, and significant geographic and cultural distance, traditional Western models of expatriate management, which emphasize high compensation and tight monitoring, often prove difficult to sustain in practice. In reality, some firms are able to maintain high levels of expatriate commitment and stable overseas project performance even when expatriate compensation is below market levels. This seemingly anomalous phenomenon poses an interesting challenge to existing theories of expatriate management and motivation.
In response to this empirical puzzle, this study reconceptualizes expatriate management not a human resource management issue, but from the perspectives of corporate governance and stakeholder governance. It focuses on how firms, constrained in the financial and monitoring tools, leverage non-financial mechanisms to coordinate the interests of multiple stakeholders, mitigate agency frictions, and sustain project performance. Taking the overseas operations of Group XF, a Chinese private manufacturing firm, as the research sample, this study adopts a connected mixed-methods research design. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 31 expatriates, supplemented by participatory observation and internal documents, the study employs three-level coding through the grounded theory method to develop and propose the analytical construct of “Governance-by-Support” (GbS), which is used to capture how firms achieve behavioral coordination and self-regulation through supportive arrangements in environments where formal oversight is weak.
The qualitative analysis indicates that GbS is not a simple management practice but a multidimensional system comprised of organizational, social, and family support. It serves as a governance substitute for high-powered monetary incentives and formal monitoring. On one hand, it systematically addresses expatriates’ residence concerns and family burdens, thereby reducing their psychological and emotional constrains in overseas contexts. On the other hand, through the social embeddedness and developmental incentives, it fosters expatriates’ sense of responsibility, organizational identification, and self-regulatory. Drawing on these findings, this study further conducted a questionnaire survey to 85 expatriates and employed regression analysis to provide convergent and complementary evidence for the construct relationships identified in the qualitative phase. Results indicate that expatriates’ perceived availability of GbS is significantly positively associated with their work engagement and self-rated project performance.
From the theoretical perspective, by introducing corporate governance and stakeholder perspectives, this study extends the explanatory scope of organizational support theory and expatriate research to encompass non-financial arrangements, illuminating the governance function of supportive practices in contexts characterized by high agency costs and weak formal oversight. From the practical perspective, it offers a cost-sensitive and contextually adaptive model of overseas governance for financially constrained emerging economy multinationals, demonstrating that non-monetary, relationship-based governance under certain conditions effectively sustain reliable performance in overseas operations.
Keywords
Governance-by-Support, expatriate management, organizational support, emerging market multinationals
Degree Awarded
SMU-SJTU Doctor of Business Administration
Discipline
International Business
Supervisor(s)
LIANG, Hao
First Page
1
Last Page
113
Publisher
Singapore Management University
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
LYU, Jixiang.
Governance-by-support: Non-financial incentive, agency costs, and performance in overseas projects. (2026). 1-113.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/851
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.