Publication Type

PhD Dissertation

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2026

Abstract

I provide the first evidence on the role of fact-checkers as a new information intermediary in capital markets. Using data from four major fact-checkers in the United States, I find that profit-oriented fact-checkers are more likely to cover firms. Furthermore, fact-checkers tend to focus on firms with higher visibility, greater proportions of retail investors, and aligned political ideologies. These findings are consistent with fact-checkers’ incentives to generate revenue and to establish a reputation for impactful and high-quality fact-checking. A difference-in-differences analysis based on PolitiFact’s transition from a profit oriented to a not-for-profit organization further demonstrates that business incentives play an important role in coverage decisions. I then examine changes in firms’ information environments following fact-checker coverage and find that firms issue less voluntary disclosure, especially when a claim turns out to be false. This suggests that external fact-checking reduces the need of costly disclosure. Finally, compared to firms with high analyst following, those with low analyst following experience liquidity improvements after fact-checker coverage, suggesting that fact-checking improves the information environment for more opaque firms.

Keywords

Fact-Checker, Misinformation, Disclosure

Degree Awarded

PhD in Accounting

Discipline

Accounting

Supervisor(s)

LOU, Yun

First Page

1

Last Page

83

Publisher

Singapore Management University

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Available for download on Thursday, June 17, 2027

Included in

Accounting Commons

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