Publication Type

PhD Dissertation

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

12-2025

Abstract

This dissertation investigates how Chinese listed companies respond strategically to negative performance gaps under different institutional environments defined by the Main Board and ChiNext Board of China’s capital market. Drawing on Performance Feedback Theory and New Institutional Theory, it explores whether and how listing board heterogeneity moderates the relation between performance shortfalls and corporate strategic transformation, and further examines the boundary effects of internal governance factors including ownership type, CEO power, and resource slack.

Using panel data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 obtained from the CSMAR database, this study employs multiple regression analysis and interaction modeling to test a two-stage framework. The first stage compares competing hypotheses: whether ChiNext firms exhibit stronger transformation responses due to legitimacy crises (H1a) or Main Board firms transform more aggressively due to resource advantages (H1b). The second stage introduces three-way interaction models to analyze how firm-level characteristics further shape this relation.

Empirical results show that negative performance gaps significantly drive strategic transformation, and that the listing board plays a moderating role. Firms listed on the ChiNext Board demonstrate a stronger transformation response under performance distress, supporting the Legitimacy Crisis Signaling Path. In contrast, Main Board firms, benefiting from structural legitimacy and institutional buffers, tend to adopt incremental strategies. Moreover, private ownership, low resource slack, and high CEO power increase the transformation intensity among ChiNext firms, while state ownership and high slack resources weaken such effects among Main Board firms.

The findings extend performance feedback theory by embedding capital market institutions into the behavioral model of strategic transformation, and provide a multilevel analytical framework combining external legitimacy pressures and internal governance dynamics. Practically, the study offers differentiated strategic and policy implications for firms, regulators, and investors, highlighting how ChiNext firms should balance innovation with risk control, while Main Board firms should enhance flexibility and avoid institutional inertia.

Keywords

Negative Performance Gap, Strategic Transformation, Listing Board, Legitimacy, Performance Feedback Theory

Degree Awarded

Doctor of Business Administration (Accounting and Finance)

Discipline

Accounting | Strategic Management Policy

Supervisor(s)

WANG, Rencheng; CHEN, Liang

First Page

1

Last Page

195

Publisher

Singapore Management University

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Author

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