Publication Type
PhD Dissertation
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2024
Abstract
Based on the higher-order theoretical perspective, this study explores the nonlinear influence mechanism of CEO value maximization tendency on corporate litigation risk and its boundary conditions. Based on the survey data of 225 CEOs in the Chinese context, it is found that CEO value maximization has a significant U-shaped relationship with corporate litigation risk, which indicates that moderate value pursuit can reduce litigation risk, but excessive pursuit will increase the possibility of risk, verifying the “dual governance effect”. Environmental uncertainty, redundant resources and CEO tenure moderated the U-shaped relationship between CEO value maximization and corporate litigation risk.
The theoretical contribution of this study is that, on one hand, it reveals the complex path of CEO value maximization tendency in risk management and enriches the application scenarios of higher-order theories; on the other hand, by identifying the key situational variables, it improves the prediction framework of corporate litigation risk, and provides valuable suggestions for firms to reduce litigation risk.
Keywords
CEO Maximizing Values, Corporate Litigation Risk, Upper Echelon Theory
Degree Awarded
SMU-SJTU Doctor of Business Administration
Discipline
Strategic Management Policy
Supervisor(s)
TAN, Wee Liang
First Page
1
Last Page
102
Publisher
Singapore Management University
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
XU, Qing.
The double-edged effect of CEO maximizing values and corporate litigation risk. (2024). 1-102.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/736
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.