Publication Type

PhD Dissertation

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

10-2025

Abstract

The capital market functions fundamentally on the principles of information, and effective information disclosure acts as the cornerstone of its operation. At present, China's capital market is fully advancing the registration-based reform that is primarily focused on information disclosure. In this context, the secretary of the board of directors ("board secretary")—who serves as the legal officer tasked with overseeing information disclosure for A-share listed companies—plays a vital role in information release and transmission.

In the context of the comprehensive implementation of the registration system and establishment of an investor-oriented capital market, this study surveys over 400 board secretaries from A-share listed companies and conducts in-depth interviews with five senior board secretaries. These methodologies aim to gather data regarding their psychological attributes, encompassing values, social axioms, cognitive styles, risk attitudes, personality traits, and proactive personality. Additionally, the study collects information related to their practices of information disclosure, particularly focusing on job satisfaction, job autonomy, personal reputation, and the performance environment. Building on this foundation, the study focuses on three aspects: the readability of the management discussion and analysis (MDA) section of annual reports, quality of disclosure on investor interaction platforms, and ESG information disclosure. Furthermore, it empirically examines the influence of board secretaries' psychological characteristics on the quality of information disclosure within the framework of "mandatory-semi-mandatory-voluntary" information disclosure.

The study findings consist of two parts: the results from the questionnaire survey and from the regression analysis based on the questionnaire data.

The findings derived from the questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews reveal several key aspects. First, board secretaries, as key figures in governance of A-share listed companies, exhibit a high degree of professionalism and educational attainment. They possess specialized qualifications and extensive experience, demonstrating a dynamic capability that often places them in important positions within their organizations. Second, the majority of board secretaries align with collectivist values, employ systematic cognitive styles, and maintain neutral attitudes towards risk. They display a strong sense of conscientiousness, operating under the belief that effort yields rewards. They value personal reputation, recognize the significance of their work and competencies, and enjoy considerable job autonomy, which correlates with their reported levels of job satisfaction. Third, the core responsibilities of board secretaries include information disclosure and investor relationship management, wherein communication skills and the capacity for continuous learning emerge as essential competencies. The quality of information disclosure is influenced by several key factors: the professional background of the board secretaries, support from the company’s chairman or actual controller, and regulatory requirements from the external environment. Fourth, insights from the interviews highlight the impact of digitalization and informatization, inter-departmental collaboration, global operations, and assessment systems for state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) on information disclosure, as well as the influence of information disclosure on industry development. The discussions offer a new perspective for understanding the factors affecting information disclosure and its economic consequences in the current context.

The empirical research findings reveal several significant insights. Firstly, the personal attributes of board secretaries in A-share listed companies significantly impact the quality of information disclosure. Specifically, the readability of texts in annual reports is notably influenced by board secretaries' values, social axioms, and risk attitudes. Additionally, the response rates on investor interaction platforms are primarily affected by board secretaries' cognitive styles, risk attitudes, and personality traits, particularly traits such as agreeableness and openness. Moreover, the quality of ESG information disclosure is significantly correlated to board secretaries' values, social axioms, cognitive styles, proactive personality, and personality traits, including agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness. Secondly, the degree of influence that the personal characteristics of board secretaries exert on information disclosure varies in intensity. These characteristics have a significantly stronger influence on voluntary information disclosures, such as those related to ESG, as opposed to semi-mandatory and mandatory disclosures. This phenomenon may be explained by the greater discretionary latitude afforded to decision-makers in the context of voluntary disclosures, thereby allowing personal attributes to more readily influence outcomes through individual behavior. Lastly, a heterogeneity test reveals that the impact of board secretaries' psychological characteristics on the quality of information disclosure differ according to the nature of property rights and the degree of independence associated with information disclosure decision-making.

The above research findings underscore the critical importance of selecting an appropriate board secretary to enhance the quality of information disclosure within listed companies. The conclusions drawn from this study hold theoretical significance by contributing to the existing literature on the economic ramifications of senior executive characteristics and the determinants of information disclosure practices. Furthermore, they have important practical implications for investors in identifying listed companies, for board secretaries in improving their performance, for the mutual selection process between listed companies and board secretaries, and for optimizing information disclosure systems and regulatory practices in the capital market.

The study provides several policy recommendations aimed at enhancing information disclosure practices within listed companies. First, it is essential to optimize the information disclosure assessment mechanism. In the investor-oriented context, regulatory authorities should augment the existing assessment system by incorporating quantitative indicators, such as text readability, the quality of response on interaction platforms, and the depth of ESG disclosures. Additionally, the feedback from investors and stakeholders should be given appropriate weight in the assessment process, and the methods utilized along with the assessment procedures should be made publicly accessible to increase transparency. Second, it is necessary to focus on the essence of information disclosure to implement assessment. Regulatory authorities should maintain an objective and neutral stance toward information disclosure, refraining from establishing direct correlations between business performance—such as declining results or investment returns—and the quality of information disclosure. This approach will prevent companies from tailoring their disclosures, whether by selectively revealing or concealing unfavorable information, to align with regulatory preferences for improved ratings, thereby ensuring assessment objectivity. Third, it is vital to clearly delineate the responsibilities and powers of board secretaries'. Establishing comprehensive mechanisms that explicitly define these responsibilities and powers, along with clear distinctions between rewards and penalties, can mitigate role ambiguity. Such clarity is vital to avoid adverse selection, which could result in the replacement of qualified board secretaries with less competent ones. Lastly, promoting the professionalization of board secretaries is of paramount importance. Initiatives should be taken to accelerate the development of a professional workforce of board secretaries, thereby enhancing their expertise and professional competencies. This will empower them to more effectively fulfill their unique governance role in regulatory practice, corporate governance, and the capital market.

Keywords

board secretaries, psychological characteristics, information disclosure quality, text readability, interactive information disclosure, ESG information disclosure

Degree Awarded

Doctor of Business Administration (Accounting and Finance)

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance

Supervisor(s)

ZHANG, Liandong

First Page

1

Last Page

304

Publisher

Singapore Management University

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Author

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