Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

12-2025

Abstract

For more than 50 years, Peter Singer has argued that we are required to donate to aid agencies. While many commentators have rejected one or more of his premises, no one appears to have challenged the argument’s validity, and it is often assumed to be valid even by critics. This article demonstrates that Singer’s common-sense morality arguments for donating to aid agencies are invalid. It then reconstructs a valid version of the argument consistent with Singer’s broader work, but shows that this version carries significant costs. The paper concludes that although we have a moral obligation to help those less fortunate, this does not entail an obligation to donate to aid agencies, nor does failing to do so necessarily constitute wrongdoing, provided the obligation to help is otherwise fulfilled.

Keywords

global poverty, individual moral obligations, Peter Singer, validity, common-sense morality arguments

Discipline

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Ethics and Political Philosophy | Nonprofit Administration and Management

Research Areas

Integrative Research Areas

Publication

Ethics & Bioethics

Volume

15

Issue

3-4

First Page

220

Last Page

232

ISSN

1338-5615

Identifier

10.2478/ebce-2025-0012

Publisher

Paradigm Publishing

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2025-0012

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