Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
6-2025
Abstract
This essay examines how Washington’s deep preoccupation with the British-Malayan counterinsurgency tactics–tactics that routed the guerilla fighters of the Malayan Communist Party–shaped US commitment to Vietnam. This US preoccupation, stoked by Britain’s (and Malaya’s) promotion of their counterinsurgency knowledge to US leaders, also influenced the lessons that US analysts and thinkers absorbed from the United States’ defeat in Indochina. Most studies of British-Malayan counterinsurgency and its connection to the Vietnam War fixate upon debating the relevance of the former to the latter and how this bears on US failures in Indochina. However, this essay focuses on the understudied fervor with which US policymakers sought to emulate Britain’s imperialistic methods, how almost obsessively they studied British-Malayan counterinsurgency and pursued British and Malayan experts to acquire their knowledge, intending to appropriate these for application to Vietnam. Equally, Britain and Malaya offered their expertise to the United States to capitalize on US admiration for Malaya’s counterinsurgency record, hoping to enhance their value to the United States. Regardless of whether British-Malayan counterinsurgency tactics were pertinent to Vietnam, US leaders’ confidence in these tactics, fed by British officials, sustained Washington’s ill-fated commitment to the unstable Saigon government. As Saigon spiraled toward collapse, British and US officials concluded, at odds with reality, that Washington had simply not studied British-Malayan tactics meticulously enough to apply them accurately in Vietnam. This myth, strengthened further due to US failures in Vietnam, would ensure the continued idealization of British-Malayan counterinsurgency into the twenty-first century.
Keywords
Colonial warfare, Malaysia, Counterinsurgency, Vietnam, Decolonization
Discipline
Asian History | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration | United States History
Research Areas
Integrative Research Areas
Publication
The Historian
Volume
87
Issue
1
First Page
20
Last Page
43
ISSN
0018-2370
Identifier
10.1080/00182370.2025.2508526
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Embargo Period
7-5-2025
Citation
NGOEI, Wen-Qing.
Emulating Empire: Washington’s preoccupation with British counterinsurgency in Malaya and U.S. commitment to Vietnam. (2025). The Historian. 87, (1), 20-43.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cis_research/372
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/00182370.2025.2508526
Included in
Asian History Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, United States History Commons