Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2013

Abstract

We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Conservation, Dynamic games, Environmental risk, Renewable resources, Tragedy of the commons

Discipline

Cultural Resource Management and Policy Analysis | Environmental Policy

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volume

37

Issue

1

First Page

125

Last Page

136

ISSN

0165-1889

Identifier

10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010

Publisher

Elsevier: 24 months

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010

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