Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

Preprint

Publication Date

6-2013

Abstract

This paper formally analyzes the biases related to self-reporting in hedge fund databases by matching the quarterly equity holdings of a complete list of 13F-filing hedge fund companies to the union of five major commercial databases of self-reporting hedge funds between 1980 and 2008. We find that funds initiate self-reporting after positive abnormal returns that do not persist into the reporting period. Termination of self-reporting is followed by both return deterioration and outflows from the funds. The propensity to self-report is consistent with the trade-offs between the benefits (e.g., access to prospective investors) and costs (e.g., partial loss of trading secrecy and flexibility in selective marketing). Finally, returns of self-reporting funds are higher than that of nonreporting funds using characteristic-based benchmarks. However, the difference is not significant using alternative choices of performance measures.

Keywords

hedge funds, self-reporting, mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure, reporting biases, selection biases

Discipline

Finance and Financial Management

Publication

Management Science

Issue

6

First Page

1271

Last Page

1289

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.1120.1647

Publisher

INFORMS

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Comments

The research was partially funded by BNPP Hedge Fund Centre at Singapore Management Centre. Copy made available with permission of the authors.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1647

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