Moore-paradoxical Assertion and Fully Conscious Belief
Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
10-2010
Abstract
Sidney Shoemaker (1995) has given an influential explanation of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief in terms of conscious belief. Here I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N., "Moore-paradoxical Assertion and Fully Conscious Belief" (2010). Research Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 967.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/967
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/967
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Acta Analytica, 2012 March, Volume 27, Issue 1, 9-12. doi: 10.1007/s12136-011-0122-4