Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2009

Abstract

In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p.

Keywords

Moore, Paradox, Belief, Brueckner

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Analysis

Volume

69

Issue

3

First Page

490

Last Page

496

ISSN

0003-2638

Identifier

10.1093/analys/anp079

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anp079

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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