Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

3-2001

Abstract

Duverger's propositions concerning the psychologicaland mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously beenexamined mainly through the lens of district magnitude,comparing the properties of single-member district pluralityelections with those of multimember proportional representationelections. The empirical consequences of multi-member plurality(MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention.Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the numberand concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether theallocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test thistheory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where districtmagnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe ofpolitical parties is held constant, applying regression analysis todata from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. Theresults indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula hasthe potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerianconsequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis ofmulti-member plurality elections from the local election datasetreveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry mayincrease with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting importantdirections for future investigation of MMP rules.

Discipline

Eastern European Studies | Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

European Journal of Political Research

Volume

39

Issue

2

First Page

203

Last Page

224

ISSN

0304-4130

Identifier

10.1023/A:1011067724688

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011067724688

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