Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2017

Abstract

I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-a-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.

Discipline

Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Philosophy

Volume

92

Issue

2

First Page

249

Last Page

269

ISSN

0031-8191

Identifier

10.1017/S0031819116000668

Publisher

Cambridge University Press

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819116000668

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