Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

10-2004

Abstract

I supply an argument for Evans’s principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore’s paradoxes.

Keywords

Moore, Paradox, Assertion, Belief, self-knowledge

Discipline

Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Analysis

Volume

64

Issue

4

First Page

348

Last Page

353

ISSN

0003-2638

Identifier

10.1093/analys/64.4.348

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Copyright Owner and License

Author

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/64.4.348

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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