Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
1-2015
Abstract
It is raining but you don't believe that it is raining. Imagine silently accepting this claim. Then you believe both that it is raining and that you don't believe that it is raining. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to believe, yet what you believe might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to believe something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore's paradox as it occurs in thought. Solving the paradox consists in explaining why such beliefs are absurd. I give a survey of some of the main explanations. I largely deal with explanations of the absurdity of ‘omissive’ beliefs with contents of the form p & I don't believe that p and of ‘commissive beliefs’ with contents of the form p & I believe that not-p as well as beliefs with contents of the form p & I don't know that p.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Philosophy Compass
Volume
10
Issue
1
First Page
24
Last Page
37
ISSN
1747-9991
Identifier
10.1111/phc3.12188
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
Williams, John N..(2015). Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey. Philosophy Compass, 10(1), 24-37.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1570
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12188