Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2006
Abstract
We consider a (deterministic) evolutionary model where players have dynamic expectations about the strategy distribution. We provide a global analysis of the co-evolution of play and expectations for a generic two-by-two game. Besides the the typical indeterminacy of the evolutionary dynamics, we find some other ones: for any initial strategy configuration the dynamics can converge to any asymptotically stable fixed point, for different initial values of the expectations. Moreover, starting from the same initial pair of strategy configuration and values of expectations, the dynamics may lead to different asymptotically stable fixed points for different parameters of the expectations.
Keywords
evolutionary games, dynamic systems, animal spirits
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
22
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 10-2006
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
ANTOCI, Angelo; LANDI, Massimiliano; and SACCO, Pier Luigi.
Expectations, Animal Spirits, and Evolutionary Dynamics. (2006). 1-22.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/894
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.