Publication Type

Conference Paper

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

8-2005

Abstract

This paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monop- olistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect compe- tition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.

Keywords

Trade policy; Political economy; Protection for sale; Monopolistic competition; Intraindustry trade

Discipline

International Economics

Research Areas

International Economics

Publication

Econometrics Society 2005 World Congress

Additional URL

http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/siuwpaper/18-2006.htm

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