Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

12-2004

Abstract

In this note, we demonstrate using two simple examples that generalization of the Banzhaf measure of voter influence to non-binary voting games that requires as starting position a voter’s membership in a winning coalition is likely to incompletely reflect the influence a voter has on the outcome of a game. Generalization of the Banzhaf measure that takes into consideration all possible pivot moves of a voter including those moves originating from a losing coalition will, on the other hand, result in a measure that is proportional to the Penrose measure only in the ternary case.

Keywords

Penrose measure, Banzhaf index, ternary games, multicandidate weighted voting games

Discipline

Econometrics

Research Areas

Econometrics

Volume

25-2004

First Page

1

Last Page

10

Publisher

SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, Paper No. 25-2004

City or Country

Singapore

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Included in

Econometrics Commons

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