Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

5-2022

Abstract

We study a class of preference domains that satisfies the familiar properties of minimal richness, diversity and no-restoration. We show that a specific preference restriction, hybridness, has been embedded in these domains so that the preferences are single-peaked at the “extremes” and unrestricted in the “middle”. We also study the structure of strategy-proof and unanimous Random Social Choice Functions on these domains. We show them to be special cases of probabilistic fixed ballot rules (introduced by Ehlers, Peters, and Storcken (2002)).

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volume

100

Identifier

10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102656

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102656

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