Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
9-2021
Abstract
We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Keywords
Complete information, Continuous implementation, Implementation, Information perturbations Maskin monotonicity, Rationalizability, Social choice function
Discipline
Econometrics
Research Areas
Econometrics
Publication
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
129
First Page
181
Last Page
197
ISSN
0899-8256
Identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
1
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.