Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

7-2017

Abstract

Motivated by the literature on random choice and in particular the random utility models, we extend the analysis in Bossert and Sprumont (2013) to include the possibility that players exhibit stochastic preferences over alternatives. We prove that every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable.

Keywords

Revealed preference, Backwards-induction, Rationalizability, Random choice, Stochastic preference

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

104

First Page

563

Last Page

567

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.003

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.003

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