Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2-2016
Abstract
I study transactions between aircraft manufacturers and airlines as well as airlines' utilization of their fleet. Aircraft production is characterized by economies of scale via learning-by-doing, which creates a trade-off between current profit and future competitive advantage in the aircraft market. The latter consideration makes large buyers more attractive than small buyers and induces quantity discounts. The resulting nonlinear pricing strategy may distort both production and allocation in favor of large buyers. In the data, there is a negative correlation between the size of aircraft orders and the per-unit price, and a positive correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate of the aircraft model. The pattern in the data suggests that the manufacturers' price discrimination leads to misallocation of aircraft.
To assess whether there is an inefficient allocation, I construct and estimate a dynamic model of the aircraft market that includes a model of utilization. Using the estimated model, I conduct counterfactual simulations where I find that uniform pricing increases aircraft production by 10% and total welfare by 1.6%.
Keywords
Vertical Relationships, Nonlinear Pricing, Dynamic Models
Discipline
Economics | Industrial Organization | Transportation
Research Areas
Macroeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
42
Citation
ONISHI, Ken.
Quantity Discounts and Capital Misallocation in Vertical Relationships. (2016). 1-42.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1734
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2739658