Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2015
Abstract
Unlike in small communities where one can strategically interact with another according to the latter’s individual reputation, players in complex societies often have to interact with strangers whose individual reputations cannot be easily acquired. They often have to infer their counterparts’ characteristics from the latters’ group reputation to simplify decision making. We provide a game theoretical model of reputation matching concerning corruption during social transformation. We show that the regime change from acquaintance matching to anonymous matching tends to cause rampant corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies is non-monotonic with respect to the supervision efforts.
Keywords
Social Transformation, Group Reputation, Reputation Matching, Corruption
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
31
Citation
WANG, Huan and ZHANG, Yi.
Social Transformation, Group Reputation, and Reputation Matching. (2015). 1-31.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1710
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.