Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
11-2013
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly dividing l divisible goods among n agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.
Keywords
Fair division, Egalitarian rules, Group strategy-proofness, Generalized Leontief preferences, Social choice, Exchange economies
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Economic Theory
Volume
54
Issue
3
First Page
597
Last Page
622
ISSN
0938-2259
Identifier
10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0
Publisher
Springer Verlag
Citation
LI, Jin and XUE, Jingyi.
Egalitarian Division under Leontief Preferences. (2013). Economic Theory. 54, (3), 597-622.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1622
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0724-0