Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

2-2014

Abstract

I argue for an alternative interpretation of King Solomon's problem in terms of one of the two claimants being “malicious”. A “malicious” claimant places no intrinsic value on the object but derives utility from depriving the rival claimant. This new interpretation permits a simpler solution than those considered in the literature; I derive a mechanism that induces truthful revelation where the equilibrium involves a single round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and no monetary transfers. I consider extensions which allow for the malicious claimant to also place some low but positive intrinsic valuation on the object; I also discuss the possibility of two-sided malice, and provide examples of several real-life contexts to which the mechanism or its extensions are applicable.

Keywords

King Solomon's problem, Mechanism design, Malice, Elimination of dominated strategies

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volume

98

First Page

125

Last Page

132

ISSN

0167-2681

Identifier

10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.014

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.014

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