Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2010
Abstract
We investigate hold-up with simultaneous and sequential investment. We show that if the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay effect, sequential investment alleviates the underinvestment caused by the hold-up problem. Further, if it is allowed to choose when to invest, strategic delay occurs when the encouragement effect of sequential complementary investments dominates the delay effect.
Keywords
Sequential Investment, Hold-up, Underinvestment, Strategic Delay
Discipline
Finance
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
16
Citation
ZHANG, Juyuan and ZHANG, Yi.
Sequential Investment, Hold-up and Strategic Delay. (2010). 1-16.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1472
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.