Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2012
Abstract
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy- proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain, is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We investigate the relationship between dictatorial and random dictatorship domains. We show that there exist dictatorial domains that are not random dictatorship domains. We provide stronger versions of the linked domain condition (introduced in Aswal et al. (2003)) that guarantee that a domain is a random dictatorship domain. A key step in these arguments that is of independent interest, is a ramification result that shows that under certain assumptions, a domain that is a random dictatorship domain for two voters is also a random dictatorship domain for an arbitrary number of voters.
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Random social choice functions, Random dictatorship
Discipline
Economics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
35
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 27-2012
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
Random Dictatorship Domains. (2012). 1-35.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1400
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Games and Economic Behavior https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017