Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
5-2011
Abstract
Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.
Keywords
Piracy, Violent crime, Economies of scale, Penalties, Moral hazard, Selfinsurance
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Economics Letters
Volume
111
Issue
2
First Page
147
Last Page
150
ISSN
0165-1765
Identifier
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.030
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
GUHA, Brishti and GUHA, Ashok S..
Pirates and Traders: Some Economics of Pirate-Infested Seas. (2011). Economics Letters. 111, (2), 147-150.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1334
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.01.030
