Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
9-2007
Abstract
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models.
Keywords
search, matching, segmentation, market structure
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Finance
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
25
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 18-2007
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
JACQUET, Nicolas Laurent and TAN, Serene.
On the Segmentation of Markets. (2007). 1-25.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1129
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 115 (4), 639-664. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/521967