Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2016

Abstract

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols have been widely deployed in many real-world applications for securing communication channels. In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we revisit the security modelling of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, and show that the existing models either impose some unnatural restrictions or do not sufficiently capture leakage attacks in reality. We then introduce a new strong yet meaningful security model, named challenge-dependent leakage-resilient eCK (CLR- eCKCLR- eCK) model, to capture challenge-dependent leakage attacks on both long-term secret key and ephemeral secret key (i.e., randomness). Second, we propose a general framework for constructing one-round CLR- eCKCLR- eCK-secure AKE protocols based on smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs). Finally, we present a practical instantiation of the general framework based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption without random oracle. Our result shows that the instantiation is efficient in terms of the communication and computation overhead and captures more general leakage attacks.

Keywords

Authenticated key exchange, Challenge-dependent leakage, Smooth projective hash function, Strong randomness extractor

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Proceedings of the The Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference 2016, San Francisco, February 29 - March 4

Volume

9610

First Page

19

Last Page

36

ISBN

9783319294841

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_2

Publisher

Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals

City or Country

San Francisco

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29485-8_2

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