Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2007

Abstract

For an ID-based key exchange (KE) protocol, KGS forward secrecy is about the protection of previously established session keys after the master secret key of the Key Generation Server (KGS) is compromised. This is the strongest notion of forward secrecy that one can provide for an ID-based KE protocol. Among all the comparable protocols, there are only a few of them that provide this level of forward secrecy, and all of these protocols require expensive bilinear pairing operations and map-to-point hash operations that may not be suitable for implementation on low-power devices such as sensors. In this paper, we propose a new ID-based KE protocol which does not need any pairing or map-to-point hash operations. It also supports the strongest KGS forward secrecy. On its performance, we show that it is faster than previously proposed protocols in this category. Our protocol is a signature-based one, in which the signature scheme is a variant of a scheme proposed by Bellare et al. in Eurocrypt 2004. We show that the variant we proposed is secure, and also requires either less storage space or runtime computation than the original scheme.

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Theoretical Computer Science

Volume

378

Issue

2

First Page

198

Last Page

207

ISSN

0304-3975

Identifier

10.1016/j.tcs.2007.02.021

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2007.02.021

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