Publication Type

Book Chapter

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2016

Abstract

Security is a critical concern around the world. In many domains from counter-terrorism to sustainability, limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times; instead, these limited resources must be scheduled, while simultaneously taking into account different target priorities, the responses of the adversaries to the security posture and potential uncertainty over adversary types.Computational game theory can help design such security schedules. Indeed, casting the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed over multiple years in multiple applications for security scheduling. These applications are leading to real-world use-inspired research in the emerging research area of "security games"; specifically, the research challenges posed by these applications include scaling up security games to large-scale problems, handling significant adversarial uncertainty, dealing with bounded rationality of human adversaries, and other interdisciplinary challenges.

Keywords

Security games, Bayesian Stackelberg games, Game theory, Scalability, Uncertainty, Bounded rationality

Discipline

Databases and Information Systems

Research Areas

Data Science and Engineering

Publication

Mathematical sciences with multidisciplinary applications

Volume

157

First Page

347

Last Page

381

ISBN

9783319313214

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-319-31323-8_16

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

New York

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31323-8_16

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