Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2018

Abstract

Duplicate record, see https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3744/. Software as a service (SaaS) has grown to be a significant segment of many software product markets. SaaS vendors, which charge customers based on use and continuously improve the quality of their products, have put competitive pressure on traditional perpetual software vendors, which charge a licensing fee and periodically upgrade the quality of their software. We develop an analytical model to study the competitive pricing strategies of an incumbent perpetual software vendor in the presence of a SaaS competitor. We find that, depending on both the SaaS quality improvement rate and the network effect, the perpetual software vendor adopts one of three different strategies: (1) an entry deterrence strategy, (2) a market segmentation strategy, or (3) a sequential dominance strategy. Surprisingly, we find that vendor competition does not always result in higher consumer surplus, and it might lead to a socially inefficient outcome under certain conditions. We further show insights into how the incumbent perpetual software vendor can defend its market position by providing incremental quality improvement through patching and/or by releasing consecutive versions with major quality upgrades. Finally, we extend our model to include the vendor’s quality improvement cost and users’ switching cost. These additional analyses help to identify the effect of different quality and cost factors on the market competitive equilibrium.

Keywords

Software as a service, SaaS, competition, network effects, pricing, switching cost, game theory, analytical modeling

Discipline

Computer Sciences | Databases and Information Systems | Management Information Systems

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

MIS Quarterly

Volume

42

Issue

1

First Page

101

Last Page

120

ISSN

0276-7783

Identifier

10.25300/MISQ/2018/13640

Publisher

University of Minnesota, Management Information Systems Research Center

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.25300/MISQ/2018/13640

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