Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

2011

Abstract

We examine a platform's optimal two-sided pricing strategy while considering seller-side innovation decisions and price competition. We model the innovation race among sellers in both finite and infinite horizons. In the finite case, we analytically show that the platform's optimal seller-side access fee fully extracts the sellers' surplus, and that the optimal buyer-side access fee mitigates price competition among sellers. The platform's optimal strategy may be to charge or subsidize buyers depending on the degree of variation in the buyers' willingness to pay for quality; this optimal strategy induces full participation on both sides. Furthermore, a wider quality gap among sellers' products lowers the optimal buyer-side fee but leads to a higher optimal seller-side fee. In the infinite innovation race, we perform computations to find the stationary Markov equilibrium of sellers' innovation rate. Our results show that when all sellers innovate, there exists a parameterization under which a higher seller-side access fee stimulates innovation.

Keywords

innovation, price competition, two-sided markets

Discipline

Computer Sciences | Technology and Innovation

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Journal of Management Information Systems

Volume

28

Issue

2

First Page

171

Last Page

202

ISSN

0742-1222

Identifier

10.2753/MIS0742-1222280207

Publisher

Taylor and Francis

Additional URL

http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/MIS0742-1222280207

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