Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
7-2004
Abstract
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact, convex strategy spaces and continuous, quasiconcave utility functions have symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finally, we discuss how to exploit symmetry for more efficient methods of finding Nash equilibria.
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Business | Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering
Publication
Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents GTDT 2004
First Page
71
Last Page
78
Publisher
GTDT
City or Country
New York
Citation
CHENG, Shih-Fen; REEVES, Daniel M.; VOROBEYCHIK, Yevgeniy; and WELLMAN, Michael P..
Notes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games. (2004). Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents GTDT 2004. 71-78.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1213
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.137.4019
Included in
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Business Commons, Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons