Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
4-2026
Abstract
Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable \textit{red-teaming frameworks} that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce \textsc{AutoBackdoor}, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including \textit{Bias Recommendation}, \textit{Hallucination Injection}, and \textit{Peer Review Manipulation}, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work.
Keywords
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Information Security
Research Areas
Software and Cyber-Physical Systems
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2026), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 23-27
First Page
1
Last Page
23
Publisher
ICLR
City or Country
Hungary
Citation
LI, Yige; LI, Zhe; ZHAO, Wei; MIN, Nay Myat; HUANG, Hanxun; MA, Xingjun; and SUN, Jun.
AutoBackdoor: Automating backdoor attacks via LLM agents. (2026). Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2026), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, April 23-27. 1-23.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/11360
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://openreview.net/forum?id=J2UFyF9YeD