Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2002

Abstract

Key recovery is a technology that allows the owner of encrypted data or a trusted third party to recover encrypted data, mostly by reconstructing lost decryption key. In [HLG99], Harn et al proposed a Global Key Recovery System (GKRS) that combines the functions of the key recovery authorities and the public key certification authorities (CAs). Among other features, user-dominance, i.e., a user is allowed to select his own public-private key pair and especially a public element for verifying the validity of the public-private key pair, is considered extremely important by [HLG99] for wide acceptance of GKRS. In this paper, we attack the RSA version of GKRS by showing that its user-dominant feature and the corresponding key verification scheme employed by the CAs allow for fraud by users against CAs. We then propose an improvement to the original GKRS. The improved system makes the probability of user fraud negligibly small.

Keywords

Safety analysis, Decryption, Public key, Certification, Cryptanalysis, Private key, Fraud

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Information Security and Privacy: 7th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2002 Melbourne, Australia, July 3-5, 2002: Proceedings

Volume

2384

First Page

17

Last Page

24

ISBN

9783540454502

Identifier

10.1007/3-540-45450-0_2

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

Berlin

Copyright Owner and License

Publisher

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45450-0_2

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