Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
Publication Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
2001
Abstract
This paper analyses the voting control structure of industrial firms listed on the official market in Germany. Voting control is highly concentrated and few companies are widely held. Widely held companies typically have takeover defences in place, but these are increasingly eroded by the control and transparency law.
Keywords
Corporations, voting power, Germany, corporate control, corporate governance, ownership, takeover defences, voting control
Discipline
Business | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Finance
Publication
The Control of Corporate Europe
ISBN
9780199257539
Identifier
10.1093/0199257531.003.0005
Publisher
Oxford University Press
City or Country
Oxford
Citation
Becht, Marco and BOEHMER, Ekkehart.
Ownership and Voting Power in Germany. (2001). The Control of Corporate Europe.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/4718
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257531.001.0001