Publication Type

Conference Paper

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

7-2010

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of airport ownership structure on management efficiency as reflected through their credit ratings. A game-theoretical model is proposed to examine the role of credit ratings in mitigating the moral hazard problem of public-owned airports. The analytical results derived from the model are then used to supplement a supporting case study. Notwithstanding the fact that the less competitive environment of a public-owned entity and its credit ratings might bring some welfare loss , this research concludes that public-owned airports have some advantages.

Keywords

Airport, Ownership, Revenue Bond, Credit Rating, Incentive Contract, Moral hazard, Hidden Action, Management Efficiency

Discipline

Operations and Supply Chain Management | Transportation

Research Areas

Operations Management

Publication

Air Transport Research Society 14th World Conference 2010, July 6-9

City or Country

Porto, Portugal

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