Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
1-2011
Abstract
We consider a two-server queueing system in which the servers choose their service rate based on the demand and holding cost allocation scheme offered by the demand generating entity. We provide an optimal holding cost allocation scheme that leads to the maximum possible service rate for each of a pooled and a split system. Our results suggest that careful allocation of holding costs can create incentives that enable minimum turnaround times using a common queue.
Keywords
Holding cost allocation, Nash equilibrium, Queueing, Service rate, Incentives, Game theory
Discipline
Operations and Supply Chain Management
Research Areas
Operations Management
Publication
Operations Research Letters
Volume
39
Issue
1
First Page
4
Last Page
12
ISSN
0167-6377
Identifier
10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.011
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
WEE, Kwan Eng and IYER, Ananth.
Consolidating or Non-consolidating Queues: A Game Theoretic Queuing Model with Holding Costs. (2011). Operations Research Letters. 39, (1), 4-12.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/3208
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2010.09.011