Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

11-2004

Abstract

This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms' investment risks [J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar, May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification. The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.

Keywords

Risk management approach, Venture capital, Portfolio diversification

Discipline

Asian Studies | Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations | Strategic Management Policy

Research Areas

Strategy and Organisation

Publication

Journal of Business Venturing

Volume

19

Issue

6

First Page

831

Last Page

849

ISSN

0883-9026

Identifier

10.1016/j.jbusvent.2003.06.004

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2003.06.004

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