Deterrence, Reputations, and Competitive Cognition

Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication Date

1998

Abstract

An aspect of competitive interactions is examined that has attracted increasing research attention: the relationships between deterrence and competitive reputations. A conceptual model of the antecedents and consequences of a firm's reputation for being a credible defender of its markets is built. Theory and limited empirical evidence suggests a firm with this reputation should deter competitive attacks against it. How a manager's competitive cognition about her opponents' patterns of activity in the marketplace and previous success can lead her to perceive a competitor as a credible defender is explored. The framework is tested using MBA students in a quasi-field setting, the Markstrat2 simulation game. The results of this study suggest that reputation deters attack only when the potential attacker considers the target firm a minor competitor.

Discipline

Business

Research Areas

Organisational Behaviour and Human Resources

Publication

Management Science

Volume

44

Issue

1

First Page

62

Last Page

82

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.44.1.62

Publisher

INFORMS

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