Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
2-2006
Abstract
In an emerging economy, the alternative to government control is often no governance. We investigate the governance structure of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore under the ownership/control structure of Temasek Holdings, the government holding entity, which typically owns substantial cash flow rights but disproportional control rights and exercises no operational control. We compare the financial and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each has a different set of governance structure, the key difference being government ownership. We show that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs. The results hold even when we control for firm specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, firm size, and foreign ownership.
Keywords
Corporate governance, Government-linked corporations, Government ownership, Singapore
Discipline
Asian Studies | Business | Corporate Finance | Finance and Financial Management
Research Areas
Finance
Publication
Journal of Multinational Financial Management
Volume
16
Issue
1
First Page
64
Last Page
88
ISSN
1042-444X
Identifier
10.1016/j.mulfin.2005.04.010
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
ANG, James and DING, David K..
Government Ownership and the Performance of Government-Linked Companies: The Case of Singapore. (2006). Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 16, (1), 64-88.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1154
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2005.04.010
Included in
Asian Studies Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons